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The remarkable and tragic victory of the Syrian revolution, after a brutal one-and-a-half-decade struggle, marked by hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced citizens, finally witnessed its dawn on December 7, 2024. However, the aftermathttps://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2025-posts/2025/3/20/from-revolution-to-constitution-making-the-syrian-peoples-struggle-and-legal-ambiguity-in-the-new-constitutional-declarationh of that historic date bears no resemblance to any previous state coup in Syria. Unlike the multiple coups of the 1950s and 1960s, where new rulers immediately sought to establish their legal status, the current scenario is entirely different.
The newly formed Victorious authority remained absent from the public sphere for 50 days following the regime’s defeat – a symbolic gesture marking 50 years of repression. Yet, when it finally emerged, it did so without presenting any constitutional declaration. The so-called ‘Syrian Revolution Victory Conference’ was, in essence, nothing more than a ceremonial event to appoint a state President – an individual who had already been exercising de facto constitutional authority without any formal minimalist constitutional declaration or even basic constitutional principles.
Syria’s state continuity remained in limbo. The last official gazette under the former regime was published on November 27, 2024, while the new authority failed to take full control of government institutions. Meanwhile, the ‘Syrian Liberation Secretariat’, which had been operating in exile in Idlib under the name the Syrian Salvation Government, had its own official gazette but had ceased publication as of November 5, 2024. Instead of formal state communications, the new vanguardship relied almost entirely on social media (particularly Twitter) for public announcements. was never officially published in any formal state record. Despite this, it included critical measures such as the dissolution of the old regime’s army and security apparatus, the permanent banning of the Ba’ath Party, and the expropriation of all its assets in favor of the new national government.
Now, without having previously established a constitutional foundation, but by mandate of the Victory Congress, an interim constitutional declaration has been signed by the newly appointed president. This document, however, is not designated as a constitution but merely as a ‘constitutional declaration’, intended to regulate governance throughout the next sixty-month transition period.
Before delving into an analysis of this constitutional document, it is worth noting its remarkable drafting quality and well-structured legal language—despite being the work of a single constitutional scholar. The polished and professional text stands in stark contrast to the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, which, despite being drafted by multiple American-trained scholars, suffered from a chaotic Arabic translation, leading to severe interpretative ambiguities.
The Essentials of the New Charter
Affirmation of the Unitary State. The unitary state model was the most fundamental demand of the Dialogue Conference (a civil society conference held on 24-25 Feb), reflecting a persistent aversion to federalism across the Arab world. Consequently, the constitutional declaration explicitly reaffirms the unitary nature of the Syrian state, mirroring the stance of the 2012 Constitution and all its predecessors.
Religious Neutrality & Continuity. The new declaration does not establish a specific state religion but instead retains the previous constitutional formula: ‘The religion of the President is Islam’ (Art. 3.1), as seen in most Syrian constitutions since the first one promulgated under the French protectorate in 1930. This provision was present in multiple Syrian constitutions, except for omissions in 1961, 1969, and 1971. Furthermore, the same article reaffirms that “Islamic jurisprudence is the main source of legislation” (Art. 3.2), introducing a significant nuance compared to Article 3.2 of the 2012 Constitution, which defined Islamic jurisprudence as ‘a principal source’ rather than ‘the main source’. This change reinforces the centrality of Islamic jurisprudence in the normative system. However, this semiotism is not unprecedented: it originally appeared in Article 3.2 of the 1953 Constitution, though it was omitted in the constitutions of 1958 and 1961, only to be reinforced by the 1962 Constitution and maintained in the temporary constitutions of 1969 and 1971. This shift aligns with Egypt’s 1981 constitutional reform, emphasizing Islamic jurisprudence as a legislative reference rather than a direct governance framework. However, this provision remains legally ambiguous; while it acknowledges religious influence, it does not automatically integrate religious rulings into governance unless formalized through parliamentary legislative act to be converted into a law of the land.
Implied Reform in Military Service. Although the charter does not explicitly abolish compulsory military service, it repeatedly associates the term ‘national army’ with the principle of “professionalism” (Art. 9.1, 48.8). This wording suggests an implicit move from the decades-long practice a hallmark of the former regime’s authoritarian grip over military conscription.
Enhanced Social & Gender Protections. The charter enshrines equal citizenship rights, with Article 10 explicitly prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, gender, or affiliation. Furthermore, Article 21 extends additional protections for women’s status in society, reinforcing their role in the family, access to education, and equal employment opportunities—marking a progressive step in comparison to previous constitutional frameworks.
Preservation of the Presidential System. The state structure outlined in the new text largely replicates the centralized presidential system of its predecessors. While it frequently refers to the separation of powers (art. 2), it maintains the judiciary’s authoritative control over military justice (art. 45.2), a defining characteristic of the old regime. Additionally, it preserves the isolation of administrative justice (art. 45.3), thereby maintaining a highly centralized governance model, reminiscent of Syria’s prior constitutional structures.
While the new charter introduces several positive features, several critical drawbacks must also be addressed, particularly in terms of the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president.
Excessive Presidential Control Over the Legislature. The charter centralizes power in the hands of the president, echoing the authoritarian structures of the past. The president has the sole discretion to appoint one-third of the National Assembly, while the remaining two-thirds are selected by a commission that he himself appoints. This circular mechanism ensures that the president controls the entire legislature, as he both appoints the commission and directly selects a significant portion of the parliament. Furthermore, the text does not specify the total number of parliamentary seats, leaving a critical ambiguity in legislative representation. This lack of clarity undermines the principles of representative democracy and risks fostering a system where executive power is disproportionately concentrated, replicating the dynamics of the previous regime.
Lack of Presidential Accountability & Impeachment Mechanism. The charter fails to provide any framework for presidential accountability, impeachment, or succession beyond internal appointment. Article 34 grants the president exclusive authority to appoint, dismiss, or accept the resignation of vice presidents. In the event of a presidential vacancy, the first vice president assumes power—without any parliamentary oversight. Additionally, Article 33 reinforces this self-referential authority, as the president first appoints the parliament, then proceeds to take his oath before the very body he created. Meanwhile, Article 27 mandates that parliament members swear their oath not before the parliamentary speaker, but directly before the president who appointed them—further entrenching executive dominance.
Unchecked War & Martial Law Powers. Article 41 expands presidential authority by allowing the head of state to declare war unilaterally, subject only to approval from the National Security Council—a body composed primarily of ministers and advisors under the president’s influence (including the defense, foreign, and interior ministers, intelligence chief, and two additional presidential advisors). This process completely bypasses parliamentary approval, contradicting fundamental democratic principles. Furthermore, the president has the power to declare martial law across the country, either fully or partially, for a three-month period—without any initial parliamentary involvement. Consultation is required only with the Parliament Speaker and the President of the Constitutional Court, but neither holds veto power. Parliamentary approval is only required for renewals beyond three months, leaving significant executive leeway to suppress civil liberties during this transitional period.
Presidential Control Over the Judiciary. The Constitutional Court, fully appointed by the president with no parliamentary oversight, lacks clear competencies under Article 47, further undermining judicial independence.
Ambiguous Transitional Justice Framework. Article 49 introduces a Transitional Justice Committee, but the declaration does not mandate a parliamentary regulatory act to define its structure or scope. This lack of clarity is particularly troubling given the historical role of the judiciary as an instrument of repression under the former regime. The Constitutional Court, a critical institution meant to ensure legal checks on executive power, is entirely appointed by the president, with no role for the parliament or any independent body in its selection process. This undermines judicial independence and raises concerns about the court’s ability to act as a counterbalance to the president’s excessive powers. Moreover, the text does not specify the court’s competencies or its role within the transitional framework, leaving its function ambiguous and vulnerable to political manipulation.
Constitutional Amendments Centralized in the Presidency. Article 50 grants the president the exclusive power to propose constitutional amendments, requiring two-thirds approval from the parliament. However, given that the parliament itself is presidentially appointed, this provision effectively eliminates any independent amendment process, further consolidating executive authority.
Ambiguity in the Transitional Period’s Timeframe. Article 52 limits the charter’s validity to five years from its enactment, but it fails to outline any extension framework should the transitional government struggle to meet this deadline. The absence of a clear contingency plan raises additional concerns about a potential constitutional vacuum at the end of this period, while the text lacks any provision for gradual progressiveness throughout this period.
Unclear Publication & Legal Effectiveness. Finally, Article 53 states that the charter takes effect upon its publication in the ‘Official Gazette’. However, it does not specify which gazette—a critical ambiguity, as no official gazette publication has been issued thus far. Until then, the charter exists only through social media announcements, resulting in further executive dominance.
Conclusion.
The most accurate adjective to describe the new governance structure in Syria is that of a de facto regime, now coupled with the category of de facto constitutionalism. While de facto states typically emerge from prolonged popular struggles, this case presents an unusual paradox: a popular victory over a repressive government that, instead of translating into a new constitutional legitimacy, is being managed with deliberate legal ambiguity. Freedom and democracy, the principles that drove the revolution, are now entirely absent from the Constitutional Declaration.
Beyond the constitutional void, Syria shows how the international community engages with new authorities despite lacking a minimal constitutional framework, proving stability and legality are not prerequisites for recognition. As Hauriou and Gicquel assert, a nation without a constitution is like an individual arriving at a formal dance in swimwear. While the emergent regime have been, de facto recognized, before having established its own constitutional structure.
Although the Constitutional Declaration provides a framework for transitional governance, it is far from being a true self-constitution of the Syrian people. Instead of laying the foundation for a new political order based on inclusion, participation, and institutional balance, it reinforces the same patterns of power personalization and lack of checks and balances that characterized the previous regime. In fact, rather than a democratic transition, it appears to be a reconfiguration of authoritarianism under a new nomenclature.
This Constitutional Declaration centralizes power without mechanisms for an inclusive transition, appearing more as an instrument of oligarchic domination than a commitment to democratic institutionalization, echoing past Arab Spring failures. As in Egypt and Tunisia, where constitutional crises reversed democratic gains—Egypt’s 2014 coup and Tunisia’s unchecked presidential expansion. Similarly, Iraq’s 2005 Constitution deepened political and sectarian fragmentation, entrenching the deep state.
The key question is whether this document will serve as the foundation for a new political order or simply represent another iteration of Syria’s entrenched authoritarian legacy. Will this transitional period lead to a more inclusive and democratic governance model, or will it further consolidate centralized power in the hands of the executive? The answer will depend not only on the internal evolution of political forces in Syria but also on the degree of interference and pressure that civil society and the international community exert on the constitutional-building process in the coming years.
If this constitutional void is not addressed, Syria could remain trapped in an indefinite transition, where power continues to be concentrated in the presidential figure, and the promise of democratization remains, once again, relegated to rhetoric.
